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dc.contributor.authorAndreas, Jörn Michaelen_US
dc.contributor.authorRapp, Marc Steffenen_US
dc.contributor.authorWolff, Michaelen_US
dc.description.abstractBuilding on a unique panel data set of German Prime Standard companies for the period 2005-2008, this paper investigates the influencing factors of both director compensation levels and structure, i.e. the probability of performance-based compensation. Drawing on agency theory arguments and previous literature, we analyze a comprehensive group of determinants, including detailed corporate performance, ownership and board characteristics. While controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we find director compensation to be set in ways consistent with optimal contracting theory. I.e. compensation is systematically structured to mitigate agency conflicts and to encourage effective monitoring. Thus, our results indicate that similar types of agency conflicts exist in the German two-tier setting.en_US
dc.publisherCenter for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCEFS working paper series 2010-06en_US
dc.subject.keywordDirector Compensationen_US
dc.subject.keywordCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordOutside Directorsen_US
dc.subject.keywordTwo-tier Systemen_US
dc.subject.keywordAgency Costsen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.titleDeterminants of director compensation in two-tier systems: evidence from German panel dataen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:CEFS Working Paper Series, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies, Technische Universität München

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