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dc.contributor.authorAmpenberger, Markusen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchmid, Thomasen_US
dc.contributor.authorAchleitner, Ann-Kristinen_US
dc.contributor.authorKaserer, Christophen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-18T08:58:42Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-18T08:58:42Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/48400-
dc.description.abstractThis study examines how family firm characteristics affect capital structure decisions. In our analysis we disentangle the influence of three distinct components of a family firm: ownership, supervisory and management board activities by the founding family. Thereby, we use a unique panel dataset of 660 publicly listed companies (5,135 firm years) in the broadest German stock index CDAX from 1995 to 2006. This paper is motivated by hitherto inconclusive empirical findings on capital structure decisions in family firms from Anglo-Saxon countries. We provide new evidence for a bank-based economy. In this sense, Germany provides a very fruitful research environment as it (i) traditionally has a bank-based financial system and (ii) family firms are considered to be the backbone of the economy. We find that family firms have significantly lower leverage ratios than non-family firms, independent of the definition of leverage applied. Among the three dimensions of a family firm, management board involvement by the founding family has a consistently negative influence on leverage across all our models. In contrast, the influence of ownership and supervisory board representation is insignificant in almost all of our models. In line with agency theory, we can show that the leverage level is the lowest if the founding family is simultaneously a large shareholder with monitoring incentives and involved in firm management with convergence-of-interest effects. Finally, we detect that the presence of a founder CEO in firm management has a significant negative effect on the leverage ratio. Our results prove to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator technique to demonstrate causal effects.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCenter for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) Munichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCEFS working paper series 2009-05en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.jelG34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordfamily firmsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfamily ownershipen_US
dc.subject.keywordfamily managementen_US
dc.subject.keywordfounder CEOen_US
dc.subject.keywordagency costsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcapital structureen_US
dc.subject.keyworddebt-equity ratioen_US
dc.subject.keywordleverageen_US
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienunternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwEigentümerstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwKapitalstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzierungstheorieen_US
dc.titleCapital structure decisions in family firms: empirical evidence from a bank-based economyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn605091218en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cefswp:200905-
Appears in Collections:CEFS Working Paper Series, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies, Technische Universität München

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