EconStor >
Verein für Socialpolitik >
Ausschuss für Entwicklungsländer, Verein für Socialpolitik >
Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2011 (Berlin) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title:Markets and Jungles PDF Logo
Authors:Gall, Thomas
Masella, Paolo
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Berlin 2011 30
Abstract:Economic institutions determine prospects for growth and development. This paper examines necessary conditions for an economy to support institutions that implement markets. Agents differ in land holdings, skill, and power. A competitive market assigns land to the skilled, not necessarily to the powerful. Therefore a market allocation needs to be robust to coalitional expropriation. In a dynamic setting, market payoffs may induce sufficient inequality in next period's endowments for markets to alternate with expropriation in a limit cycle, decreasing efficiency and amplifying macroeconomic fluctuations. Long run stability of markets is favored by higher social mobility, more initial equality, and less mismatch between demand and supply.
market institutions
coalition formation
Document Type:Conference Paper
Appears in Collections:Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, 2011 (Berlin)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
30_gall.pdf252.44 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.