Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48113
Authors: 
Reina, Livia
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Dresden discussion paper in economics 05/03
Abstract: 
Many negotiations offer a potential for integrative agreements in which the parties can maximize joint gains (through logrolling) without competing for resources as in a 0-sum game; nevertheless negotiators often fail to exploit this potential and settle for suboptimal, distributive agreements. In this study a situation of two-issues bilateral negotiation has been considered. Our aim is to get some insight on the causes that prevent negotiators from reaching integrative, Pareto-optimal agreements. We ran two experiments (one with policy makers and one with students) in which we tested the "fixed pie bias" of negotiators, and we introduced a new explanation for suboptimality, based on the hypothesis of a satisficing (not optimizing) behavior of negotiators, which leads them to a "zone of agreement bias"(ZAB).
Subjects: 
integrative negotiation
logrolling
cognitive bias
satisficing
JEL: 
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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