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dc.contributor.authorKoppel, Hannesen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchulze, Günther G.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-11T10:08:34Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-11T10:08:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47901-
dc.description.abstractWe conduct a natural field experiment on direct and indirect transfer mechanisms for small donations. Charitable contributions are significantly higher if made indirectly, i.e. if they are tied to the purchase of a good sold at a premium, than if they are made directly. Donations are significantly higher under both transfer mechanisms if people are given a suggested reference donation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv., Dep. of International Economic Policy Freiburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion paper series // University of Freiburg, Department of International Economic Policy 10en_US
dc.subject.jelD64en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtied versus untied transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordcharitable donationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcharity, willingness to giveen_US
dc.subject.keywordpro social behavioren_US
dc.subject.stwSpendeen_US
dc.subject.stwSoziales Verhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsbündelen_US
dc.subject.stwWillingness to payen_US
dc.subject.stwFeldforschungen_US
dc.titleOn the channels of pro-social behavior: Evidence from a natural field experimenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn619919949en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:iep Discussion Paper Series, Department of International Economic Policy, Universität Freiburg

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