EconStor >
Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg im Breisgau >
Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik, Universität Freiburg >
Diskussionsbeiträge, Inst. f. Verkehrswissenschaft u. Regionalpolitik, Universität Freiburg >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47618
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBrunekreeft, Gerten_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-06T15:53:50Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-06T15:53:50Z-
dc.date.issued1997en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47618-
dc.description.abstractThis paper compares two regulatory devices for handling (access to) bottlenecks in deregulated network industries: (1) a local price cap and (2) a global price cap, the latter of which applies the efficient component pricing rule. The local price cap restricts profit regulation to the bottleneck, whereas a complementary set of measures intends to curb the resulting incentives for foreclosure of the competitive markets. The global price cap extends regulation to the entire firm, which should take away the foreclosure incentives. This major advantage of the global price cap is contrasted to possible disadvantages, which centre around renewed foreclosure incentives.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherFreiburg i. Br.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge // Institut für Verkehrswissenschaft und Regionalpolitik 36en_US
dc.subject.jelL43en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelL9en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwNetzzugangen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwMarkteintritten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleLocal versus global price cap: A comparison of foreclosure incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn258352957en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:aluivr:36-
Appears in Collections:Diskussionsbeiträge, Inst. f. Verkehrswissenschaft u. Regionalpolitik, Universität Freiburg

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
258352957.pdf109.8 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.