|
EconStor >
Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen >
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Tübingen >
Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47575
|
| | |
| Title: | | Financing and product market competition: Optimal contracts with venture capitalists  |
| Authors: | | Neff, Cornelia |
| Issue Date: | | 2000 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 162 |
| Abstract: | | We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. In particular, we focus on the interaction between venture capital financing and product market competition: A young firm with a risky innovation project attempts to enter a market where it faces two periods of price competition with an incumbent firm. Since the young firm is wealth-constrained, it seeks equity financing from a venture capital company. The allocation of funds and learning about the project's quality are both subject to moral hazard. We analyze the provision of capital under (i) short-term and (ii) long-term contracting, and compare the results. |
| Subjects: | | Venture Capital Dynamic Financial Contract Moral Hazard and Learning Innovation and Market Entry Strategic Competition |
| JEL: | | G32 L13 O31 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-21175 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47575
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|