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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47553
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| Title: | | Does cooperation in manufactoring foster tacit collusion  |
| Authors: | | Neubecker, Leslie |
| Issue Date: | | 2003 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 261 |
| Abstract: | | This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in the market. Compared to non-cooperation in manufacturing, coordination of the investments in production yields a higher competitive profit. If firms intensify cooperation and produce in a joint plant, this profit is still higher due to lower investment costs. Since firms return to competition after a defection from the collusive agreement, a high competitive profit implies a weak punishment. Collusion is thus more difficult, the closer firms cooperate in manufacturing. Moreover, given competition or collusion in the market, joint production yields the highest profit and welfare. |
| Subjects: | | ): Manufacturing Cooperative production Dynamic competition Collusion |
| JEL: | | C73 L13 L23 L41 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-18717 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge, Universität Tübingen
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