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dc.contributor.authorLechene, Valérieen_US
dc.contributor.authorPreston, Ianen_US
dc.description.abstractWe study non cooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against non cooperative alternatives and the non cooperative model against a general alternative.en_US
dc.publisherInstitute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) Londonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIFS working papers 10,18en_US
dc.subject.keywordNash equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntra-household allocationen_US
dc.subject.keywordSlutsky symmetryen_US
dc.subject.stwPrivater Haushalten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.titleNon cooperative household demanden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

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