EconStor >
Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London >
IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47460
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAttanasio, Orazioen_US
dc.contributor.authorPellerano, Lucaen_US
dc.contributor.authorPhillips, Daviden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-04T09:18:43Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-04T09:18:43Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47460-
dc.description.abstractSeveral decades of conflict, rebellion and unrest severely weakened civil society in parts of Colombia. Desarollo y Paz is the umbrella term used to describe the set of locally-led initiatives that aim at addressing this problem through initiatives to promote sustainable economic development and community cohesion and action. In this paper we analyse the findings from a series of 'public good' games that were conducted between November 2005 and February 2007 in 104 municipalities in rural and urban Colombia with mainly poor participants. The data covers municipalities both with ('treatment') and without ('control') a PRDP in place, and within the 'treatment' municipalities, both beneficiaries and non beneficiaries of the PRDP initiative. The data for 'control' municipalities was collected as part of the evaluation of Familias en Accion (FeA), Colombia's conditional cash transfer programme.The game is structured as a typical free-rider problem with the act of contributing to the 'public good' (a collective money pot) being always dominated by non-contribution. We interpret contribution as an act consistent with a high degree of social capital.Potentially endogenous selection into the programme makes identifying programme effects difficult but we find strong and suggestive evidence that exposure to PRDPs improve social capital and that this extends beyond direct beneficiaries of the programme. In particular, the duration of programme operation and the proportion of programme beneficiaries in a game session increase contribution to the public good, suggesting that in order to have a major impact the programme must be sufficiently 'intensive'.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherInst. for Fiscal Studies Londonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIFS working papers 09,20en_US
dc.subject.jelC93en_US
dc.subject.jelI38en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSocial Capitalen_US
dc.subject.keywordConflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordPublic Goodsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEvaluation Methodsen_US
dc.subject.stwBürgerkriegen_US
dc.subject.stwInnere Sicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.subject.stwTrittbrettfahrerverhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwSocial Capitalen_US
dc.subject.stwKolumbienen_US
dc.titlePeace and goodwill? Using an experimental game to analyse the Desarrollo y Paz initiative in Colombiaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn609958739en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
609958739.pdf4.29 MBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.