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Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47349
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Greaker, Mads | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Hoel, Michael | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-07-01T08:43:49Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-07-01T08:43:49Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47349 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Since governments can influence the demand for a new abatement technology through their environmental policy, they may be able to expropriate innovations in new abatement technology ex post. This suggests that incentives for environmental R&D may be lower than the incentives for market goods R&D. This in turn may be used as an argument for environmental R&D getting more public support than other R&D. In this paper we systematically compare the incentives for environmental R&D with the incentives for market goods R&D. We find that the relationship might be the opposite: When the innovator is able to commit to a licence fee before environmental policy is resolved, incentives are always higher for environmental R&D than for market goods R&D. When the government sets its policy before or simultaneously with the innovator's choice of licence fee, incentives for environmental R&D may be higher or lower than for market goods R&D. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Oslo | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2011,15 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q55 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q58 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | R&D | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | environmental R&D | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | innovations | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | endogenous technological change | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Industrielle Forschung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Umwelttechnik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Innovation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Ökonomischer Anreiz | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Umweltpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Endogener technischer Fortschritt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Incentives for environmental R&D | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 657899755 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
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