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Title:Epistemically stable strategy sets PDF Logo
Authors:Asheim, Geir B.
Voorneveld, Max
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2010,01
Abstract:This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.
Subjects:Epistemic game theory
epistemic stability
rationalizability
closedness under rational behavior
mutual p-belief
JEL:C72
D83
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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