Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340
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dc.contributor.authorAsheim, Geir B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Maxen_US
dc.contributor.authorWeibull, Jörgen W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:43:39Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:43:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo |cOsloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo |x2010,01en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEpistemic game theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordepistemic stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordrationalizabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordclosedness under rational behavioren_US
dc.subject.keywordmutual p-beliefen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwRationales Verhaltenen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.titleEpistemically stable strategy setsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn617789126en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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