Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340 
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dc.contributor.authorAsheim, Geir B.en
dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Maxen
dc.contributor.authorWeibull, Jörgen W.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:43:39Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:43:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340-
dc.description.abstractThis paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Oslo, Department of Economics |cOsloen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMemorandum |x2010,01en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEpistemic game theoryen
dc.subject.keywordepistemic stabilityen
dc.subject.keywordrationalizabilityen
dc.subject.keywordclosedness under rational behavioren
dc.subject.keywordmutual p-beliefen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwRationales Verhaltenen
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.titleEpistemically stable strategy sets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn617789126en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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