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Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340
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| Title: | | Epistemically stable strategy sets  |
| Authors: | | Asheim, Geir B. Voorneveld, Max Weibull, Jörgen W. |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2010,01 |
| Abstract: | | This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets. |
| Subjects: | | Epistemic game theory epistemic stability rationalizability closedness under rational behavior mutual p-belief |
| JEL: | | C72 D83 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
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