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Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47328
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Nyborg, Karine | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Zhang, Tao | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-07-01T08:43:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-07-01T08:43:25Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47328 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Firms with a reputation as socially responsible may have an important cost advantage: If workers prefer their employer to be socially responsible, equilibrium wages may be lower in such firms. We explore this hypothesis, combining Norwegian register data with data on firm reputation collected by an employer branding firm. Adjusting for a large set of background variables, we find that the firm's social responsibility reputation is significantly associated with lower wages. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Dep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Oslo | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2011,01 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C51 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D21 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D64 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q56 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Self-regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | wage differentials | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | CSR | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Is corporate social responsibility associated with lower wages? | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 644897074 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
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