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dc.contributor.authorBaldursson, Fridrik M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorvon der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:43:16Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:43:16Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47321-
dc.description.abstractWe consider an industry with firms that produce a final good emitting pollution to different degree as a side effect. Pollution is regulated by a tradable quota system where some quotas may have been allocated at the outset, i.e. before the quota market is opened. We study how volatility in quota price affects firm behaviour, taking into account the impact of quota price on final-good price. The impact on the individual firm differs depending on how polluting it is - whether it is 'clean' or 'dirty' - and whether it has been allocated quotas at the outset. In the absence of long-term or forward contracting, the optimal initial quota allocation turns out to resemble a grandfathering regime: clean firms are allocated no quotas - dirty firms are allocated quotas for a part of their emissions.With forward contracts and in the absence of wealth effects initial quota allocation has no effect on firm behaviour.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2009,11en_US
dc.subject.jelD81en_US
dc.subject.jelD9en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelL51en_US
dc.subject.jelQ28en_US
dc.subject.jelQ38en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordregulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordeffluent taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordtradable quotasen_US
dc.subject.keyworduncertaintyen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental managementen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltmanagementen_US
dc.subject.stwQuotenregulierungen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidung bei Unsicherheiten_US
dc.subject.stwZeitpräferenzen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Regulierungen_US
dc.titlePrice volatility and risk exposure: On the interaction of quota and product marketsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn598761594en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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