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Title:Waiting to merge PDF Logo
Authors:Fumagalli, Eileen
Nilssen, Tore
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2008,13
Abstract:We set up a sequential merger game to study a firm's incentives to pass up on an opportunity to merge with another firm. We find that such incentives may exist when there are efficiency gains from a merger, firms are of different sizes, there is an antitrust authority present to approve mergers, and there is a sufficient alignment of interests between the antitrust authority and the firms. We point out three distinct motives for not merging: the external-effect motive, the bargaining-power motive, and the pill-sweetening motive.
JEL:L11
L13
L41
G34
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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