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Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47311
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| Title: | | Playing with the good guys: A public good game with endogenous group formation  |
| Authors: | | Brekke, Kjell Arne Hauge, Karen Evelyn Lind, Jo Thori Nyborg, Karine |
| Issue Date: | | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2009,08 |
| Abstract: | | In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start of high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will selfselect into groups committed to charitable giving. Testing this experimentally, we let subjects choose between two group types, where one type donate a fixed amount to a charity. Contributions in these groups stayed high, whereas contributions in the other groups showed the well known declining pattern. One implication is that corporate social responsibility may attract more responsible employees. |
| Subjects: | | Altruism conditional cooperation self-selection |
| JEL: | | D11 D12 D64 H41 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
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