EconStor >
University of Oslo >
Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47296
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAsheim, Geir B.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHelland, Leifen_US
dc.contributor.authorHovi, Jonen_US
dc.contributor.authorHoyland, Bjornen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:42:46Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:42:46Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47296-
dc.description.abstractWe provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game design that includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce the same results as the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity significantly. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2008,26en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSelf-serving Biasen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimental Economicsen_US
dc.subject.keywordDictator Gameen_US
dc.subject.stwExperimentelle ├ľkonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwEigeninteresseen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleSelf-serving dictatorsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn583844588en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
583844588.pdf302.62 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.