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Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47296
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| Title: | | Self-serving dictators  |
| Authors: | | Asheim, Geir B. Helland, Leif Hovi, Jon Hoyland, Bjorn |
| Issue Date: | | 2008 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2008,26 |
| Abstract: | | We provide experimental evidence of self-serving fairness ideals in a dictator game design that includes treatments where funds can be transferred in two ways to the one player and in one way to the other. Two methods for transferring funds to the recipient produce the same results as the regular dictator game. However, two methods for transferring funds to the dictator reduce her generosity significantly. Hence, the fairness ideal adopted by dictators appears to be equal share per individual in the former case (as in the regular dictator game), and equal share per transfer method in the latter case. |
| Subjects: | | Self-serving Bias Experimental Economics Dictator Game |
| JEL: | | C91 D63 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo
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