Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47295
Authors: 
Lind, Jo Thori
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2010,08
Abstract: 
I consider a society with heterogeneous individuals who can form organizations for the production of a differentiated service. An arrangement of organizations is said to be split up stable when there is no majority to split any of the organizations. Unlike other equilibrium concepts in the literature, the largest number of organizations that is split up stable corresponds to the socially optimal number of organizations, with a possibility of over provision of one organization. The analysis is extended to a case with endogeneous membership, where it is shown that the results remain the same.
Subjects: 
Organizations
public goods
split up stability
efficiency
endogenous membership
JEL: 
D71
D73
H49
L31
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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