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dc.contributor.authorEyckmans, Johanen_US
dc.contributor.authorKverndokk, Snorreen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-01T08:42:14Z-
dc.date.available2011-07-01T08:42:14Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47270-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate how moral concerns about permit trading affect an endogenous pollution permit trading equilibrium, where governments choose non-cooperatively the amount of permits they allocate to domestic industries. Politicians may feel reluctant to allow permit trading and/or may prefer that abatement is undertaken domestically due to moral concerns. This will have an effect on the initial permit allocations, and, therefore, on global emissions. The impact on global emissions depends on the precise formulation of the moral concerns, but under reasonable assumptions, we show that global emissions may increase. Thus, doing what is perceived as good does not always yield the desired outcome. However, this can be offset by restrictions on permit trading when governments have moral concerns about this trade.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDep. of Economics, Univ. of Oslo Osloen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesMemorandum // Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2009,13en_US
dc.subject.jelD63en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordTradable emission permitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordinternational environmental agreementsen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-cooperative game theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordmoral motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordidentityen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationale Umweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwEthiken_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleMoral concerns on tradable pollution permits in international environmental agreementsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn602493064en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo

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