Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/47036
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dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T15:10:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T15:10:13Z-
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/47036-
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the issue of competitiveness and environmental regulation from the viewpoint of strategic environmental policy models. It demonstrates that the incentive for strategic policies is determined only by the reaction of the opponent. Furthermore, it shows that the conditions under which relatively strict environmental policies may lead to an increase in the profits of the domestic industry are rather artificial. The result depends in a rather complex way on the type of competition and several effects of research and development or environmental quality specification, and on the assumption that a unilateral policy is possible.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKiel Working Papers |x858en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwStrategische Handelspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwIndustrielle Forschungen_US
dc.subject.stwTechnologiewahlen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Wettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleCompetitiveness and environmental policies in strategic environmental policy modelsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:858-
dc.identifier.printppn258226544en_US

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