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dc.contributor.authorBartsch, Elgaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T15:06:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T15:06:09Z-
dc.date.issued1996en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46930-
dc.description.abstractIn providing precautionary incentives and allocating environmental risk, liability for environmental damages faces two difficulties: randomness of damages incurred and nonobservability of precautionary measures. Hence, a major obstacle in enforcing legal claims is the difficulty of proving causation. In order to alleviate the proof of causation, the German Umwelthaftungsgesetz introduces a refutable causality presumption. When imperfect information is taken into account, this conditional reversal of the burden of proof cannot ensure optimal precaution. Using a principalagent model, optimality conditions for a modified strict liability rule is derived. A specific rule for the optimal allocation of environmental damages under probabilistic causation and asymmetric information is obtained using a linear model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKiel Working Papers 755en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelK32en_US
dc.subject.jelQ20en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwUmwelthaftungen_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleEnforcement of environmental liability in the case of uncertain causality and asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn257748601en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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