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dc.contributor.authorLorz, Jens Oliveren_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-30T15:04:53Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-30T15:04:53Z-
dc.date.issued1999en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46925-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper redistribution policy is analyzed in a 2-period overlapping generations model with heterogeneous individuals and asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. Individuals of the same generation differ with respect to their labor productivity. In each period, the respective government decides not only about the distribution of consumption between the working generation and the retired but also about the distribution within generations - between individuals with a high and with a low productivity of labor. The government in period 1 is not able to determine the policy of the subsequent government in period 2. In the political equilibrium, consumption of high- and low-productivity individuals is inefficiently allocated over their life cycle. For a given level of aggregate savings, a Pareto-improvement would be achieved, if high-productivity individuals consumed less during their working life and more during retirement in the following period, whereas low-productivity individuals had to consume more during their working life and less during retirement. In addition to this inefficiency, the government in period 1 may choose an inefficient level of aggregate savings in the equilibrium. It is shown for a specific example that an increase in aggregate savings would be Pareto-improving.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKiel Working Papers 904en_US
dc.subject.jelE62en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelD82en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordOverlapping generationsen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensumverteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwGenerationenbeziehungenen_US
dc.subject.stwOverlapping Generationsen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwSparenen_US
dc.subject.stwIntertemporale Allokationen_US
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe political economy of intra- and intergenerational redistribution with asymmetric informationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn265587654en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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