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dc.contributor.authorStähler, Franken_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper discusses the role of transfers in a non-cooperative environment. If reselling in-kind-transfers involves some retrading costs, in-kind transfers are supposed to realise at least some of the mutual bargaining gains which would be left unexploited by mere use of monetary payments. These retrading costs bias the recipient's consumption plans in favour of the donor. However, the paper shows that non-enforceability alone does not support the exclusive application of inkind transfers in general because income effects can leave some scope for monetary transfers. The results of the model are discussed for some applications.en_US
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesKiel Working Papers 702en_US
dc.subject.keywordIn-kind transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordmonetary transfersen_US
dc.subject.keywordoptimal policiesen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentlicher Transferen_US
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten_US
dc.titleOptimal transfer policiesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
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