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Title:Optimal transfer policies PDF Logo
Authors:Stähler, Frank
Issue Date:1995
Series/Report no.:Kiel Working Papers 702
Abstract:This paper discusses the role of transfers in a non-cooperative environment. If reselling in-kind-transfers involves some retrading costs, in-kind transfers are supposed to realise at least some of the mutual bargaining gains which would be left unexploited by mere use of monetary payments. These retrading costs bias the recipient's consumption plans in favour of the donor. However, the paper shows that non-enforceability alone does not support the exclusive application of inkind transfers in general because income effects can leave some scope for monetary transfers. The results of the model are discussed for some applications.
Subjects:In-kind transfers
monetary transfers
optimal policies
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Kieler Arbeitspapiere, IfW
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des IfW

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