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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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| Title: | | Finite-population 'Mass-Action' and evolutionary stability  |
| Authors: | | Bernergard, Axel Wärneryd, Karl |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Empirical and Theoretical Methods 3378 |
| Abstract: | | Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability. |
| Subjects: | | mass action finite population games evolutionary stability |
| JEL: | | C72 C73 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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