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Title:Finite-population 'Mass-Action' and evolutionary stability PDF Logo
Authors:Bernergard, Axel
Wärneryd, Karl
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Empirical and Theoretical Methods 3378
Abstract:Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for mixed strategy equilibria of 2 × 2 games, the requirement of such a correspondence is equivalent to neutral evolutionary stability.
Subjects:mass action
finite population games
evolutionary stability
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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