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dc.contributor.authorvan der Ploeg, Fredericken_US
dc.contributor.authorRohner, Dominicen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:21:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:21:06Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46547-
dc.description.abstractAlthough the relationship between natural resources and civil war has received much attention, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Controversies and contradictions in the stylized facts persist because resource extraction is treated as exogenous while in reality fighting affects extraction. We study endogenous fighting, armament, and extraction method, speed and investment. Rapacious resource exploitation has economic costs, but can nevertheless be preferred to balanced depletion due to lowered incentives for future rebel attacks. With private exploitation, rebels fight more than the government if they can renege on the contract with the mining company, and hence government turnover is larger in this case. Incentive-compatible license fees paid by private companies and mining investment are lower in unstable countries, and increase with the quality of the government army and office rents. This implies that privatised resource exploitation is more attractive for governments who have incentives to fight hard, i.e., in the presence of large office rents and a strong army. With endogenous weapon investments, the government invests more under balanced than under rapacious or private extraction. If the government can commit before mining licenses are auctioned, it will invest more in weapons under private extraction than under balanced and rapacious nationalized extraction.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Finance 3244en_US
dc.subject.jelD45en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelL71en_US
dc.subject.jelQ34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordconflicten_US
dc.subject.keywordnatural resourcesen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivate resource exploitationen_US
dc.subject.keywordmining investmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordlicense feeen_US
dc.subject.stwRohstoffressourcenen_US
dc.subject.stwRessourcenökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwRohstoffpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwBürgerkriegen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleWar and natural resource exploitationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640577652en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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