Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46538
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dc.contributor.authorLehmann, Etienneen_US
dc.contributor.authorParmentier, Alexisen_US
dc.contributor.authorvan der Linden, Brunoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:57Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:57Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46538-
dc.description.abstractWe characterize optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. Average tax rates are increasing at the optimum. This shifts wages below their laissez faire value and distorts labor demand upwards. The marginal tax rate is positive at the top of the skill distribution even when the latter is bounded. These results are analytically shown under a Maximin objective when the elasticity of participation is decreasing in the skill level and are numerically confirmed under a more general objective.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Public Finance |x3324en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-linear taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordrandom participationen_US
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor market frictionsen_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwSteuerprogressionen_US
dc.subject.stwFriktionelle Arbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitslosigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwAdverse Selectionen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarkttheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleOptimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemploymenten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659080648en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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