Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46536
Authors: 
Balafoutas, Loukas
Beck, Adrian
Kerschbamer, Rudolf
Sutter, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Behavioural Economics 3461
Abstract: 
Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by sellers. This paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. Results reveal that taxi drivers cheat passengers in systematic ways: Passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system leads to manipulated bills. Higher income seems to lead to more fraud.
Subjects: 
credence goods
expert services
natural field experiment
taxi rides
fraud
asymmetric information
JEL: 
C93
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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