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dc.contributor.authorStrand, Jonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:36Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:36Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46519-
dc.description.abstractI study climate policy choices for a 'policy bloc' of fuel-importers, when a 'fringe' of other fuel importers have no climate policy, fuel exporters consume no fossil fuels, and importers produce no such fuels. The policy bloc and exporter blocs act strategically in fossil fuel markets. When the policy bloc sets a carbon tax, the fuel import price set by the exporter is reduced, and more so when the policy bloc is larger. The carbon tax then serves to extract the exporter's rent. The fringe also gains from reduced fuel import prices, and gains more when the policy bloc is larger. When the policy bloc sets an emissions cap, fuel demand becomes less price elastic. In response, a monopolistic exporter sets the fuel export price higher than under a tax, which hurts both the policy bloc and the fringe. This effect can be stronger when the policy bloc is larger, so that the fringe loses when the policy bloc is larger, opposite to the tax policy case. Overall, a cap is inferior to a tax for fossil fuel importers, both those that implement a climate policy, and those that do not.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Energy and Climate Economics 3233en_US
dc.subject.jelQ31en_US
dc.subject.jelQ38en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.jelQ58en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordclimate policyen_US
dc.subject.keywordcarbon taxesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcap-and-trade schemesen_US
dc.subject.keywordcarbon emissionsen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic trade policyen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkosteueren_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltauflageen_US
dc.subject.stwStrategische Handelspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwFossiler Energieträgeren_US
dc.subject.stwImporten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTaxes versus cap-and-trade in climate policy when only some fuel importers abateen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640176577en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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