EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46518
  

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBaharad, Eyalen_US
dc.contributor.authorGoldberger, Jacoben_US
dc.contributor.authorKoppel, Mosheen_US
dc.contributor.authorNitzan, Shmuelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:35Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:35Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46518-
dc.description.abstractThe difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Public Choice 3323en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsparadoxonen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBeyond condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting recordsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659079097en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
659079097.pdf285.11 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.