Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46518
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dc.contributor.authorBaharad, Eyalen_US
dc.contributor.authorGoldberger, Jacoben_US
dc.contributor.authorKoppel, Mosheen_US
dc.contributor.authorNitzan, Shmuelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-18en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:35Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:35Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46518-
dc.description.abstractThe difficulty of optimal decision making in uncertain dichotomous choice settings is that it requires information on the expertise of the decision makers (voters). This paper presents a method of optimally weighting voters even without testing them against questions with known right answers. The method is based on the realization that if we can see how voters vote on a variety of questions, it is possible to gauge their respective degrees of expertise by comparing their votes in a suitable fashion, even without knowing the right answers.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Public Choice |x3323en_US
dc.subject.jelD70en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwAbstimmungsparadoxonen_US
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBeyond condorcet: Optimal aggregation rules using voting recordsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659079097en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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