Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46514
Authors: 
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Cornes, Richard
Rübbelke, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3374
Abstract: 
Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only under very special conditions. But we show in this note that corner solutions, in which some agents choose zero flat contributions, normally avoid underprovision and illustrate and interpret our results by a simple numerical example.
Subjects: 
public goods
matching
Pareto optimality
JEL: 
C78
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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