Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46511
Authors: 
Aidt, Toke
Shvets, Julia
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3405
Abstract: 
We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less state funds to their district when they cannot run for re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this tendency is less pronounced in states with many legislative districts.
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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