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Title:Distributive politics and electoral incentives: Evidence from seven US state legislatures PDF Logo
Authors:Aidt, Toke
Shvets, Julia
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3405
Abstract:We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage individual legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less state funds to their district when they cannot run for re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this tendency is less pronounced in states with many legislative districts.
JEL:D72
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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