Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46504
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dc.contributor.authorBordignon, Massimoen_US
dc.contributor.authorMonticini, Andreaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-20en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46504-
dc.description.abstractWe employ bootstrap methods (Efron (1979)) to test the effect of an important electoral reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Par-liament from purely proportional to plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Public Choice |x3347en_US
dc.subject.jelH00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordelectoral systemen_US
dc.subject.keywordplurality ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordDuverger's lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordbootstrapen_US
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen_US
dc.subject.stwReformen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien_US
dc.subject.stwPluralismusen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitische Stabilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwItalienen_US
dc.titleThe importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn659395541en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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