Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46504 
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dc.contributor.authorBordignon, Massimoen
dc.contributor.authorMonticini, Andreaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-20-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46504-
dc.description.abstractWe employ bootstrap methods (Efron (1979)) to test the effect of an important electoral reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Par-liament from purely proportional to plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3347en
dc.subject.jelH00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordelectoral systemen
dc.subject.keywordplurality ruleen
dc.subject.keywordDuverger's lawen
dc.subject.keywordbootstrapen
dc.subject.stwWahlsystemen
dc.subject.stwReformen
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Parteien
dc.subject.stwPluralismusen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Stabilitäten
dc.subject.stwItalienen
dc.titleThe importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn659395541en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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