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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46504
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| Title: | | The importance of the electoral rule: Evidence from Italy  |
| Authors: | | Bordignon, Massimo Monticini, Andrea |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3347 |
| Abstract: | | We employ bootstrap methods (Efron (1979)) to test the effect of an important electoral reform implemented in Italy from 1993 to 2001, that moved the system for electing the Par-liament from purely proportional to plurality rule (for 75% of the seats). We do not find any effect on either the number of parties or the stability of governments (the two main objectives of the reform) that remained unchanged at their pre-reform level. |
| Subjects: | | electoral system plurality rule Duverger's law bootstrap |
| JEL: | | H00 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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