Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46500
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dc.contributor.authorSkaperdas, Stergiosen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:20:16Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:20:16Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46500-
dc.description.abstractProprietary rule, whereby the state is owned by a ruler who maximizes tax revenues minus the costs of governing, is a useful ideal type that describes many of the states that have ever existed. The study of proprietary rule and its public finance, however, is comparatively scarce. I argue that proprietary rule emerges out of anarchy and its main alternative - selfgovernance - has difficulties surviving because of problems in providing effective internal and external security. Competitive proprietary rule (or, organized anarchy) is the market structure for the provision of security that is more stable, but is highly inefficient because all the savings that come out of the public provision of security are dissipated into contests for power among proprietary rulers. I also explore how competitive proprietary rule can be consolidated into more complex forms of governance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Public Choice |x3495en_US
dc.subject.jelH59en_US
dc.subject.jelN47en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleProprietary public finance: On its emergence and evolution out of anarchyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn662659937en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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