EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46497
  
Title:Fighting multiple tax havens PDF Logo
Authors:Elsayyad, May
Konrad, Kai A.
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3195
Abstract:This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a 'big bang' multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their 'tax haven business' more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their 'tax haven business'. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.
Subjects:tax haven
harmful tax practices
bidding for haven inactivation
JEL:F21
H26
H77
H87
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
639443303.pdf285.98 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46497

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.