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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46492
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Blumkin, Tomer | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Sadka, Efraim | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Shem-Tov, Yotam | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-10 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-29T11:20:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-06-29T11:20:07Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46492 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | In this paper we employ a tax-competition model to demonstrate that in the presence of migration the re-distributive advantage of a non-linear income tax system over a linear (flat) one is significantly mitigated relative to the autarky (no-migration) equilibrium. When migration threats are sufficiently strong, a coordinated shift from a non-linear (prima-facie superior) system to a flat (inferior) regime is not too welfare-costly, even when the extent of re-distribution is significant. Therefore, such a shift may be warranted on administrative grounds. We also show, as expected, that migration reduces the extent of redistribution. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3471 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D60 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H20 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H50 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | flat tax | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | re-distribution | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | migration | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | tax-competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Flat Tax | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Einkommensteuer | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Steuerwettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Internationale Arbeitsmobilität | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Einkommensumverteilung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Labor migration and the case for flat tax | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 66190704X | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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