Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46470 
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dc.contributor.authorBecker, Sascha O.en
dc.contributor.authorBoeckh, Katrinen
dc.contributor.authorHainz, Christaen
dc.contributor.authorWoessmann, Ludgeren
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:42Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:42Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46470-
dc.description.abstractDo empires affect attitudes towards the state long after their demise? We hypothesize that the Habsburg Empire with its localized and well-respected administration increased citizens' trust in local public services. In several Eastern European countries, communities on both sides of the long-gone Habsburg border have been sharing common formal institutions for a century now. Identifying from individuals living within a restricted band around the former border, we find that historical Habsburg affiliation increases current trust and reduces corruption in courts and police. Falsification tests of spuriously moved borders, geographic and pre-existing differences, and interpersonal trust corroborate a genuine Habsburg effect.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3392en
dc.subject.jelN33en
dc.subject.jelN34en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelZ10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordHabsburg Empireen
dc.subject.keywordtrusten
dc.subject.keywordcorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordinstitutionsen
dc.subject.keywordbordersen
dc.subject.stwKommunalverwaltungen
dc.subject.stwVertrauenen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwSoziale Werteen
dc.subject.stwMeinungen
dc.subject.stwSüdosteuropaen
dc.subject.stwUngarnen
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen
dc.subject.stwÖsterreich-Ungarnen
dc.titleThe empire is dead, long live the empire! Long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn660151820en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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