Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46466
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dc.contributor.authorVerbon, Harrie A. A.en_US
dc.contributor.authorWithagen, Cees A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46466-
dc.description.abstractIn the standard setting a system of tradable permits is effective and cost-efficient in attaining the policy objective of pollution reduction. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal system/constitution with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, under various institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Resource and Environment Economics |x3236en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelH23en_US
dc.subject.jelQ00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordtradable permitsen_US
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwAllokationen_US
dc.titleDo permit allocations matter?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn640576877en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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