Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46466 
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dc.contributor.authorVerbon, Harrie A. A.en
dc.contributor.authorWithagen, Cees A.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46466-
dc.description.abstractIn the standard setting a system of tradable permits is effective and cost-efficient in attaining the policy objective of pollution reduction. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal system/constitution with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, under various institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3236en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.jelH23en
dc.subject.jelQ00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtradable permitsen
dc.subject.keywordfiscal federalismen
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen
dc.subject.stwFinanzföderalismusen
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken
dc.subject.stwAllokationen
dc.titleDo permit allocations matter?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn640576877en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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