Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46466
Authors: 
Verbon, Harrie A. A.
Withagen, Cees A.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Resource and Environment Economics 3236
Abstract: 
In the standard setting a system of tradable permits is effective and cost-efficient in attaining the policy objective of pollution reduction. This outcome is challenged in case of a tradable permit system in a federal system/constitution with individual states having discretionary power regarding environmental policy and where pollution is transboundary across states. This paper explores the opportunities of the central authority to influence the effectiveness and efficiency of the system, under various institutional arrangements, through the initial allocation of permits.
Subjects: 
tradable permits
fiscal federalism
JEL: 
H21
H23
Q00
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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