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Title:Why does environmental policy in representative democracies tend to be inadequate? A preliminary public choice analysis PDF Logo
Authors:Kollmann, Andrea
Schneider, Friedrich G.
Issue Date:2010
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3223
Abstract:There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy yet. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation in the past decade the Public Choice theory is used. The players' behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy instead of command-and-control measures are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insights into how to overcome them.
Subjects:public choice and environmental policies
sustainability
voters
government
interest groups
tradeable permits
green taxes
JEL:D23
D62
D72
D73
H23
Q57
Q58
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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