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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Vida, Péter | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Forges, Francoise | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-05-23 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-29T11:19:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-06-29T11:19:26Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3360 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D70 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Bayesian game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | cheap talk | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | communication equilibrium | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | correlated equilibrium | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | pre-play communication | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kommunikation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gleichgewicht | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 659466902 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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