|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455
|
| | |
| Title: | | Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case  |
| Authors: | | Vida, Péter Forges, Francoise |
| Issue Date: | | 2011 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3360 |
| Abstract: | | We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk. |
| Subjects: | | Bayesian game cheap talk communication equilibrium correlated equilibrium pre-play communication |
| JEL: | | C72 D70 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46455
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|