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Title:Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case PDF Logo
Authors:Vida, Péter
Forges, Francoise
Issue Date:2011
Series/Report no.:CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3360
Abstract:We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a pos-sibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
Subjects:Bayesian game
cheap talk
communication equilibrium
correlated equilibrium
pre-play communication
JEL:C72
D70
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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