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dc.contributor.authorPérez-Castrillo, Daviden_US
dc.contributor.authorQuérou, Nicolasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:25Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:25Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46454-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is 'smoother' in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an equal sharing of the surplus that it induces. Finally, it enables reaching an outcome as close to efficiency as is desired.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3394en_US
dc.subject.jelD78en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen_US
dc.subject.keywordNIMBYen_US
dc.subject.stwProjektbewertungen_US
dc.subject.stwStandortwahlen_US
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwMechanism Designen_US
dc.subject.stwShapley-Werten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleSmooth multibidding mechanismsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn660154633en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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