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EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46451
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Brekke, Kurt R. | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Holmås, Tor Helge | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Straume, Odd Rune | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-12-13 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-29T11:19:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-06-29T11:19:22Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2010 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46451 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We study the impact of regulation on competition between brand-names and generics and pharmaceutical expenditures using a unique policy experiment in Norway, where reference pricing (RP) replaced price cap regulation in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent products. First, we construct a vertical differentiation model to analyze the impact of regulation on prices and market shares of brand-names and generics. Then, we exploit a detailed panel data set at product level covering several off-patent molecules before and after the policy reform. Off-patent drugs not subject to RP serve as our control group. We find that RP significantly reduces both brand-name and generic prices, and results in significantly lower brand-name market shares. Finally, we show that RP has a strong negative effect on average molecule prices, suggesting significant cost-savings, and that patients' copayments decrease despite the extra surcharges under RP. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation 3258 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | I11 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | I18 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L65 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | pharmaceuticals | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | generic competition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Pharmazeutisches Produkt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Staatliche Preispolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Preiswettbewerb | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Produktdifferenzierung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Generika | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Gesundheitskosten | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Norwegen | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Reference pricing, competition, and pharmaceutical expenditures: Theory and evidence from a natural experiment | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 641609000 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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