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dc.contributor.authorMoreno-Bromberg, Santiagoen_US
dc.contributor.authorTaschini, Lucaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:21Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:21Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46450-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo working paper: Energy and Climate Economics 3399en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.jelH20en_US
dc.subject.jelL50en_US
dc.subject.jelQ50en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionsrechteen_US
dc.subject.stwEmissionshandelen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltschutzinvestitionen_US
dc.subject.stwTechnologiewahlen_US
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePollution permits, strategic trading and dynamic technology adoptionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn660160374en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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