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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46450
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Taschini, Luca | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-05-25 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2011-06-29T11:19:21Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2011-06-29T11:19:21Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2011 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46450 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo working paper: Energy and Climate Economics 3399 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D80 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H20 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L50 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | Q50 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Emissionsrechte | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Emissionshandel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Umweltschutzinvestition | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Technologiewahl | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Theorie | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Pollution permits, strategic trading and dynamic technology adoption | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 660160374 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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