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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46442
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| Title: | | Voting when the stakes are high  |
| Authors: | | Andersen, Jørgen Juel Fiva, Jon H. Natvik, Gisle James |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3167 |
| Abstract: | | Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout. |
| Subjects: | | voter motivation elections turnout |
| JEL: | | D72 H71 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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